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Abstract: 
Price-earnings ratios are part of the toolkit that is used for assessing the valuation of 
individual firms on the stock market as well as the entire market itself. This paper 
presents consistent P/E series for the liquid Danish shares adjusted for share buy-
backs. The results show that over the period from 1969 to 2003, the average (trailing) 
P/E equals 13.5. The P/E reaches its lowest level in 1980, which is likely to be due to 
a soaring oil price, high wage increases and interest rates approaching 20 percent. 
Notwithstanding optimistic equity pricing also in Denmark in the late 1990s, the 
upturn in Danish valuations was more moderate than in the US. The correction that 
sets in subsequently reversed essentially the gains in the Danish P/E in the 1990s. 
 
 
 
 
1.Introduction1 
 
Price-earnings ratios are part of the toolkit that is used for assessing the valuation of 
individual firms listed on the stock market as well as the entire market itself. In spite 
of the popularity of the price-earnings multiple, well documented long price-earnings 
series are rare outside the Anglo-Saxon countries.2  
 
The purpose of this paper is to present price-earnings series for the last 35 years for 
Danish stock market. To this end we have collected price, earnings and share data 
information, including information on share buy-backs and option programs, for the 
20 largest and most liquid shares. These shares constitute by and large the KFX price 
index, which, however, only goes back to 1989.  
 
The construction of the P/E index is based on the principles of liquidity and historic 
consistency. As regards liquidity, we decided the index should only include the liquid 
B shares but not the A shares since large trades in A shares are generally not feasible 
given that they typically are owned by the founding family and a few other dominant 
shareholders. A shares therefore trade with a discount even though they have superior 
voting rights. As regards consistency, it is obviously important to use the same 
earnings concept throughout the sample period. Given that the Result for the Year 
(Årets Resultat) is an earnings measure companies have reported throughout the 
sample period it is natural to use this measure. Moreover, the Result for the Year has 
also the desirable feature that it is similar to Standard and Poor’s Reported Earnings, 
which makes a comparison to the S&P series feasible. Sticking to the same earnings 
concept is necessary but not sufficient to ensure that earnings are comparable over 
time due to possible changes in accounting. It is therefore important to watch out for 
significant changes in accounting practices. In our reading of firms’ income 
statements we have on a few occasions encountered abrupt accounting changes; in 
these cases we only include the most recent data for the particular share. That said, 
the general impression we have from screening firms’ income statements, including 
their overlapping earnings estimates based on previous and new rules, is that 
accounting changes have only had marginal effects on firms’ earnings.3  
                                          
1 The paper has been presented at the Copenhagen Business School, the International Atlantic Economic Conference 
2004, Chicago and LD Pensions, Copenhagen. I thank Trewor Chamberlain, Jeppe Christiansen, Carsten Krogholt 
Hansen, Kurt Kara, Allan Layton and Steen Thomsen for comments and suggestions. I am also grateful to Mikael 
Mosekilde and Jakob Thomsen for invaluable assistance in compiling and managing the data and to “Account-CBS” 
and “Erhvervs & Selskabsstyrelsen” for giving me access to the companies’ financial reports.  Finally, I thank SSF for 
financial support. 
2 Datastream publishes a P/E series for the Danish market that goes back to 1973. Datastream sets negative earnings 
arbitrarily to zero and deviates also from the present paper in a number of other ways, cf. below. 
3 This could, however, also reflect some forward-looking behavior. Thus, companies may have incorporated some of 
the accounting changes prior to the rules were finally enacted into law.  
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Besides estimating valuation multiples for the liquid part of the market, the paper also 
assesses the quantitative importance of firms’ holdings of own shares and employee 
option programs, which is usually disregarded. However, as share buy-backs have 
become increasingly important we have found it relevant also to make an assessment 
of this issue.  
 
Historic price-earnings data have many applications. They can be used in assessments 
of current valuations as in Shiller (2000) and in many previous contributions. They 
can also be used to analyze trading strategies and specific historic events, see for 
example Fama and French (1998) and Lakonishok et al. (1994). In this paper, we use 
the data to shed new light on the bull market in 1983 and the bear market in the early 
1990s. It is well known that one of the key explanations of the doubling of the share 
prices in 1983 is the sharp fall in interest rates following the successful Danish 
Stabilization, see OECD (1986) and Dornbusch (1989). The data in this paper shows, 
however, that the soaring equity prices also had support in an impressive upturn in 
earnings. The strong earnings fundamentals indicate that the supply side may have 
played a larger role in the 1982/83 recovery than what has hitherto been considered to 
be the case. The point is that firms base their investment and employment decisions 
on their own profitability estimates and not on economy wide profits and wage data, 
which show much less movement to justify the unusual strong expansion in output 
and employment. Barry (1999) also hints at the possibility that the supply side may 
have been underestimated; future work should look more into this issue.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the underlying 
principles of the P/E series. Section 3 presents and discusses key characteristics of the 
data. The emphasis is on historic valuations and trends in the market. Section 4 
concludes the paper. Annex 1 to 3 presents further evidence.  
 
 
2. Underlying Principles and Methodology 
 
This section begins by defining a P/E index in theory. Next we describe the principles 
underlying this paper’s empirical P/E index. To this end we first describe the type of 
shares that enter the index. We then turn to the underlying earnings definition. In this 
section we also describe how we deal with mergers, fundamental changes in balance 
sheets, significant changes in accounting and negative earnings. The latter is an issue 
that we pay particular attention to due to Datastream’s unorthodox handling of 
negative earnings. Finally, we describe how we adjust for companies’ share buy-
backs and we also discuss the effects of employee option programs.   
 
 
 2
2.1 Interpretation of a P/E index 
 
We begin by recalling the interpretation of an aggregate P/E index. To this end we 
use the following notation: Let pj, nj , ej denote the price, the number of shares and 
earnings per share of firm j. Firm j’s total earnings is given as Ej  = njej.; total market 
earnings E is the sum of all individual firm earnings ∑Ej . The market value of each 
firm is Vj=pjnj.  
 
A P/E index is defined as a weighted average of the individual firms’ price-earnings 
pj/ej; weights are firms’ earnings ejnj  relative to market earnings E, 
 
P/E = ∑(pj/ej)(ejnj/E)                                                                                           (1) 
 
By multiplying the numerator and the denominator by nj, the aggregate P/E can also 
be shown to equal the market value of all companies relative to their total earnings 
 
P/E = ∑Vj/E                                                                                                         (2) 
 
A P/E index can therefore be thought of as a weighted average of firms’ price-
earnings, as shown by (1), but is also equal to the total market value relative to total 
earnings as shown by (2). Let us now move on to present the shares that enter the 
index. 
 
2.2 Shares in the Index 
 
Table 1 presents the shares in the KFX (the Danish Blue Chips) price index from its 
inception in 1989 to 2003. The table shows that the number of shares in the index has 
varied from 19 (minimum) to 25 (maximum), but has for more than a decade been 
held at 20. Over its lifetime, 57 shares have been into the KFX index.  
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Company 1989 1990 1991 1992 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
Banking
Andelsbanken 3,2
BG Bank 13,7
Bikuben 3,7 4,4
Den Danske Bank 9,7 15,7 16,8 12,6 20,3 48,4 42,9 98,9 98,8
Handelsbanken 6,0
Jyske Bank 2,6 2,8 2,6 3,4 7,7 6,1 6,4 11,2
Nordic Baltic Holding/Nordea 23,5 15,7
Privatbanken 4,7
Provinsbanken 4,1
Unidanmark 11,4 9,2 4,7 12,9 23,8 34,0
Insurance
Baltica 9,7
Baltica Holding 6,9 13,3 10,1 2,3
Codan forsikring 5,2 6,6
Hafnia Holding A 2,3 3,1 2,3
Hafnia Holding B 3,1 3,6 2,8
Kapital Holding (RealDanmark) 20,9
Topdanmark 2,8 3,4 2,5 1,8 2,6 7,9
Industry
Bang & Olufsen 5,0
Carlsberg A 3,5 3,9 13,3 9,0
Carlsberg B 6,4 7,2 8,9 10,6 8,0 10,0 7,8
Chr. Hansen
Coloplast 3,6 5,9 7,8 12,2 11,2
Danisco 8,7 9,2 11,0 6,8 14,8 23,4 16,8 17,3 13,9
FLS B 5,6 4,7 3,3 3,3 6,3 7,3
GN Store Nord 1,5 2,7 4,3 14,3 10,9 8,4
H. Lundbeck 17,2 49,1 23,1
i-data international
Navision Damgaard (Navision) 8,1
Navision Software 6,2
NEG Micon 5,5 2,6
NKT 2,8 3,1 2,8
Novo Nordisk B 8,2 8,6 15,4 17,6 24,4 63,3 63,4 102,0 72,4
Novozymes B 10,9 14,0
Radiometer B 2,0 1,9 3,5
Superfos 2,2 2,1 2,2 3,0 5,4
Vestas Wind Systems 13,7 24,0 10,2
William Demant 10,4 16,1 14,1
Service & Trade
Danske Luftfartselskaber 3,9
DSV B 5,5
Group 4 Falck 3,8 10,0 19,3 10,8
ISS B 1,9 2,1 2,9 3,4 3,3 6,5 16,9 17,2 13,0
KBH Lufthavne 3,8 7,5
Luftfart A 3,1 1,7
Ratin 16,5
SAS Danmark 4,8
S. Berendsen A
S. Berendsen B 3,0 3,9 6,1 6,9 11,2 22,5 3,4
Teledanmark B/TDC 19,2 27,0 118,8 63,8 46,3
ØK 5,8 4,7 4,0 1,8 2,4
Shipping
DFDS 1,3
D/S 1912 A 9,6 8,8 11,3 8,5
D/S 1912 B 9,6 8,8 11,3 8,3 11,4 34,2 47,0 30,4
J. Lauritzen Holding 3,6 3,2 4,3 3,2
Svendborg B 9,7 8,7 11,2 8,2 11,4 33,7 45,8 28,0
Svendborg A 9,7
A.P. Møller - Mærsk A 88,8
A.P. Møller - Mærsk B 93,2
Investment
FIH B
Potagua B 3,0 2,5
Number of shares in KFX 25 24 25 19 20 20 20 20 20
Source: Copenhagen Stock Exchange
Table 1: Shares in the KFX portfolio; market capitalization in billions of DKK(selected years)
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Table 1 also lists the market value of the shares in selected years (the complete table 
can be found in Annex 1). The table shows that Danske Bank, D/S 1912 B and D/S 
Svendborg B (now A.P. Møller Mærsk), Novo Nordisk B and Teledanmark (now 
TDC), have over an extended period been the largest shares accounting for more than 
50 percent of the market. Moreover, D/S 1912 B and D/S Svendborg B, the two 
parent companies of the A.P. Møller Group, account for well above 10 percent of the 
market until 2003.4 Following the merger of D/S 1912 and Svendborg in 2003, the 
Stock Exchange included not only the B share but also the A share in the KFX. The 
inclusion of the A share in combination with a soaring share price tripled the weight 
of the A.P. Møller in the KFX. The A share is, however, not nearly as liquid as the B 
share given that the A share to a very large extent is held by the founding family, 
including family foundations, and a few other dominant investors. Due to that the A 
share also trades with a discount in spite of superior voting rights. Because of the 
reduced liquidity one can argue that it should only be the B share that should enter 
the index. And indeed this is also the approach taken in this paper. The P/E index we 
outline therefore includes the B shares and the other companies in the KFX who only 
have one share class. In this respect, the P/E universe deviates from the KFX as the 
KFX also included other A shares in the past, see Table 1. 
 
Like many other indexes, the KFX also suffers from an element of cross ownership. 
In general, it is not possible to clean the KFX up for this simply because historic data 
on cross holdings are unpublished. There are, however, a few adjustments that can be 
done. We have for example taken Potagua out of the P/E index because Potagua is a 
pure holding company with large ownerships in the two KFX shares FLS and NKT.5  
 
To prevent that the universe (sample) becomes too small due to the above mentioned 
adjustments (exclusions), we have each year replaced those shares we take out with 
new shares adopting the same criteria as the Stock Exchange uses in picking the KFX 
shares in the first place. Prior to the inception of the KFX in 1989, we decided that 
the P/E index should contain 20 shares. The P/E index extends the KFX universe 20 
years back in time to 1969.  
 
The KFX provides information on the (value weighted) share price development but 
the Stock Exchange does not publish an index that relates this development to firms’ 
                                          
4 The A.P. Møller Group is the largest Danish company. The company is into shipping (world leader in container 
transportation), oil, manufacturing and retail, see Risager (2003). Novo Nordisk is into pharmaceuticals with world 
leadership in insulin production. TDC is the “old Danish telephone company” now entirely owned by private investors 
like all the other companies in the KFX. Danske Bank has by far the largest market capitalization of the banks reflecting 
that only a minor portion of Nordea (a merger of Swedish, Finnish and Danish banks) is traded on the Copenhagen 
Stock Exchange. 
5 Potagua was in the KFX in 1990 and 1991. As the KFX in some years also included both DFDS and Lauridsen 
Holding (who had a large stake in DFDS) we also excluded DFDS in those years where Lauridsen entered the index. 
We adopted a similar procedure for Baltica and Baltica Holding.  
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profits. Given that the aim of this paper is to construct such an index we now outline 
the underlying earnings concept. 
 
2.3 Earnings Concept, Changes in Accounting and Mergers & Acquisitions 
 
We use the Result For the Year (Årets Resultat) as our profit measure, defined as 
revenue less (almost all) costs, including interest, taxes, depreciation and payments to 
minority shareholders.6 This is a natural profit measure to use in a historic analysis 
given that it is the only profit measure firms have consistently reported throughout 
the sample period. Moreover, it should also be noted that this unadjusted earnings 
measure has probably not been managed (massaged) as much as other and more 
recent earnings measures that adjust for so-called non-recurrent events since the latter 
tend to invite to earnings management as emphasized by Cortes, Lyon and Marsh 
(2002). On a few occasions, one-time events may, however, be of such an importance 
that some action (adjustment) seems appropriate to prevent that numbers convey a 
false impression. This is the case when companies fundamentally change their 
balance sheets due to e.g. divestures. In those cases we decided to exclude companies 
from the index since it is generally impossible to sort out how much of the reported 
earnings that is due to a sell off of assets and how much that is due to normal 
business. Fortunately, it is only a few times we have found it necessary to do this.7 
Finally, it should be noted that the Result For the Year is similar to Standard and 
Poor’s Reported Earnings, and it is therefore meaningful to compare our index with 
one of the P/E series published by the Standard and Poor’s say e.g. the S&P 500 (for 
the largest shares in the US).  
 
As shares represent ownership of both the parent company and its associates, 
earnings should include profits from associates. Provided firms follow the so-called 
equity principle, reported earnings will also include earnings from associates. A.P. 
Møller (D/S 1912 and D/S Svendborg) did, however, not report earnings on a 
consolidated basis prior to the new accounting law of 2002. In the official earnings 
statements, the company only included dividends from the associates. P/E multiples 
for the two stocks were therefore significantly higher in the past and simply not 
comparable to current multiples due to differences in accounting.8 The company itself 
has restated its earnings 5 years back in time under the new accounting rules, see A.P. 
Møller (2002). It is therefore possible to include the A.P. Møller shares from 1997 
and onwards (using the restated earnings) whereas the share for consistency reasons 
should not be included in the index prior to 1997. 
                                          
6 In general, firms have not expensed stock options, which is an issue we will return to. 
7 GN Store Nord’s and NKT’s divestures of Sonofon and Giga in 2000 are cases in point.   
8 D/S Svendborg and 1912 traded at an average P/E above 80 in the period 1983-01. The company (A.P. Møller-Mærsk) 
now trades at a multiple significantly below 20 (in spite share prices roughly doubled in 2003). 
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In the sampling of the other companies’ earnings we have also looked for abrupt 
changes in earnings in particular in 2002 and in the early 1990s when new accounting 
rules were implemented. The lesson we draw from reading firms’ overlapping 
earnings estimates based on new and previous rules is that accounting changes only 
have had moderate effects on earnings in general. This could, however, also reflect 
that firms have been forward looking and hence gradually implemented the new rules 
prior to the enactment of the law.9  
 
In years with M&A, the P/E concept becomes blurred. Thus, in the beginning of the 
year we have well defined separate balance sheets and P/E’s, but when companies are 
merged into a single entity with one new share price we can not construct a 
meaningful price-earnings ratio for that year. We therefore exclude companies that 
merge in the year where the merger takes place.10 
 
The next issue is how one should deal with negative individual firm earnings? If 
earnings are negative, the P/E for a single share is obviously without meaning. Given 
that the aggregate index is a weighted average of individual price-earnings as shown 
by (1), one may think that firms with negative price-earnings should not enter the 
index. Following this line of thinking, the aggregate P/E would then only provide 
information on the valuation of the firms with positive earnings.  
 
However, when we think about the P/E index from an aggregate perspective equal to 
the total market value relative to total earnings as shown by (2), it seems reasonable 
also to include the negative earnings. In this case the index preserves the desirable 
property embodied in (2), that is, states the valuation of all companies relative to total 
market earnings. This is the approach taken by Standard and Poors in the construction 
of their P/E series and this will also be the approach adopted in this paper. 
 
This approach differs from the P/E series published by Datastream. The Datastream 
approach is to exclude companies with negative earnings in the denominator but not 
in the numerator in (2). In other words, Datastream includes the market value in the 
numerator, but sets earnings equal to zero in the denominator in case the company 
has negative earnings. The latter approach seems hard to justify on a conceptual 
level.11 Moreover, when negative earnings arbitrarily are set to zero, the P/E index 
does no longer equal the total market value relative to total earnings. We expect that 
                                          
9 There are a few other cases where earnings change abruptly because of new practices. In these years, the share is 
excluded from the index. 
 
10 There is one exception to this and that is the merger of D/S 1912 and D/S Svendborg into A.P. Møller-Mærsk that 
took place in June 2003 given that the companies were already effectively operating under the same umbrella prior to 
the merger and given that it is straightforward to consolidate the two shares at the year end of 2002.    
11 As I found this procedure puzzling, I contacted Thomson Financial who confirmed that this indeed the approach.  
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the P/E multiple in this case is lower than in the case where negative earnings are 
included.12 Below, we estimate how much the Datastream approach biases the P/E 
downwards. 
 
 
2.4 Share Buy-Backs and Options 
 
Like in many other countries share buy-backs have become increasingly popular in 
Denmark in the late 1990s. Table 2 lists Danish companies’ holding of own shares in 
2003. The table shows that almost all companies have share buy-back programs. The 
(simple) average holding of own shares is 3.3 percent. The table also shows that out 
of these companies there are three who do not have options or any other share based 
remuneration scheme in 2003. This is A.P. Møller, Nordea and William Demant.13 
For this group of firms we should adjust (increase) the earnings per share figure with 
a factor that reflects these companies’ own share holdings. For A.P. Møller, the P/E 
in 2003 declines by a factor 0.7 from 10.8 to 10.1 due to this adjustment. For the 
other two firms the adjustment is much smaller given that their own holdings are 
significantly lower. 
 
For firms who simultaneously engage in share buy-backs and employee option 
programs matters are more complicated. Thus, in case the company’s stock of own 
shares equals the value of the options, one should not adjust given that these shares 
upon exercise of the options will be handed over to the employees who will then 
become a new group of shareholders. From our reading of companies’ reports it 
appears that firms often hold large inventories of own shares because they want to be 
on the safe side in the hedging strategy and because the share acquisition programs 
also serve the purpose of reducing the share capital and in some cases reducing the 
risk of a hostile takeover. Unfortunately, firms do not in general publish how large a 
proportion of their own holdings that meets the option commitments and the aim of 
reducing the share capital. Due to that it is not possible to come up with a precise 
estimate of the appropriate adjustment factor for the remainder of the firms. 
                                          
12 This is strictly speaking an empirical issue because negative earnings may also reduce the numerator. 
13 Nordea in particular had option programs in earlier years, which will be taken into account. 
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Company Total number of shares Own shares in percent Option  programs1)
Banking
Den Danske Bank 711675849 5,5 YES
Jyske Bank 36000000 0 NO
Nordic Baltic Holding/Nordea 2846499727 2,9 NO
Insurance
Topdanmark 24717501 10,7 YES
Industry
Carlsberg B 35.257.090 A, 28.649.192 B 4,8 YES
Coloplast 1.800.000 A, 22.200.000 B 2,2 YES
Danisco 53199602 2,6 YES
GN Store Nord 219775063 3,9 YES
H. Lundbeck 233741985 1,0 YES
Neg Micon 26711027 1,4 YES
Novo Nordisk B 53.743.600 A, 300.950.560 B 4,7 YES
Novozymes B 10.748.720 A, 64.690.112 B 7,9 YES
Vestas 105003966 0 NO
William Demant 70293953 2,5 NO
Service & Trade
DSV B 20770206 3,7 YES
Group 4 Falck 88862400 0,7 YES
ISS 44309894 0,4 YES
TDC 216459540 1,5 YES
Shipping
A.P. Møller - Mærsk A+B 2197800 A, 2197800 B 6,4 NO
Average own holding 3,3
Source: Company Reports
Notes: 1) The exsistence of remuneration schemes based on the value of the company's shares (options and warrants)
Table 2: Holding of own shares 2003 (Year end)
 
However, to obtain insight into the quantitative magnitude of the problem we look at 
two polar cases  
 
Let us first consider the extreme case where the options never get into the money. In 
this case we should make an adjustment for all companies’ own holdings. When we 
adjust for all companies’ share buy-backs we obtain for example for 2003 a P/E that 
equals 13.5. In the polar case where companies’ own holdings are committed to 
option programs we can ignore the share buy-backs of the 16 companies in 2003. In 
this case, the aggregate P/E equals 13.9 in 2003. These calculations show that there is 
a margin of uncertainty of around 0.4. Put differently, a P/E at 13.9 in 2003 is 
potentially upward biased with a factor that at maximum equals 0.4 due to an 
incomplete treatment of share buy-backs for those companies who also have share 
based incentive programs.  
 
For the previous years 1997-2002, we have also collected data on own holdings and 
share based incentive schemes. On the basis of this information, we adjust the price- 
earnings for those companies who hold own shares but who do not have option based 
remuneration schemes. Subsequently, we estimated the max error that we are making 
by not adjusting for those companies who also have option based remuneration 
schemes. On average, the result is that our reported P/E estimate is upward biased 
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with a factor that at maximum equals 0.4 due to an incomplete treatment of share 
buy-backs for those companies who also have option based remuneration schemes.  
 
Before ending this discussion it should, however, also be noted that options and share 
buy-backs not only affect the proper estimate of the number of shares to be used in 
the eps calculation, it also affects the estimate of earnings itself given that firms have 
not expensed options. In other words, the official earnings numbers overstate the true 
earnings. Unfortunately, it is a hard if not an impossible task to estimate the bias in 
the reported earnings for a number of reasons that we will not go into in this paper.14 
That said, it should be noted that guesstimates point to a bias in the interval 2 to 4 
percent. If there is something to that, the “true” P/E should be about 0.4 higher. In 
other words, the P/E we report (and which adjust for own shares for those companies 
who do not have option programs) is likely to be fairly close to the theoretical correct 
P/E. 
 
 
2.5 Differences and Similarities to Datastream’s P/E  
 
Finally, we briefly explain key differences and similarities to Datastream’s P/E series. 
First, Datastream sets negative earnings to zero, while we include both negative and 
positive earnings. We estimate the importance of this below. Like Datastream we also 
work with the Result for the Year. Secondly, Datastream includes both A and B 
shares, whereas we only include the liquid B shares. Third, unlike Datastream we 
have controlled for large changes in accounting methods and have for example 
excluded the A.P. Møller shares prior to 1997 simply because earnings were grossly 
understated in the past reflecting that earnings were not reported on a consolidated 
basis. We also made adjustments for large divestures and mergers. Fourth, we adjust 
the P/E for companies’ own holding of shares if they do not have option programs but 
not in case they have option schemes. Due to that the reported P/E could at maximum 
be 0.4 too high. However, since firms have not expensed options in the first place and 
since earnings could be overstated by 2 to 4 percent, it seems likely that the P/E we 
report is fairly close to the theoretical correct P/E. Finally, Datastream does not make 
adjustments for companies’ share buy-backs or option programs.  
 
 
 
 
                                          
14 Beckmann and Jørgensen (2004) present a wealth of interesting evidence on the use of option-based compensation in 
Danish firms. They also discuss valuation issues, but they do not estimate the consequence of expensing options on 
firms’ income statements.  Companies will start expensing options in 2005. 
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3. Price-Earnings: An Overview of the Landscape 
 
This section gives a broad overview of the major trends. Following this we turn to 
some of the more remarkable years in the history of the stock market. 
 
3.1 Major Trends 
 
Table 3 summarizes key statistics on the P/E multiple over the 35-year period from 
1969 to 2003. The average trailing P/E, defined as the year-end market price relative 
to earnings over the year, equals 12.3 if we disregard the two crisis years 1990 and 
1992, but equals 13.5 if those years are included, cf. below. 
 
In the early 1990s, the P/E skyrocketed due to highly depressed earnings in banking 
but also in other sectors, cf. below. The gloomy business environment culminates in 
1992. In that year total earnings is actually negative. Hence, the P/E is negative. In 
1990 and 1991, the P/E stands at 327.5 (three hundred and twenty seven point five) 
and 33.2, respectively. As noted, the estimated mean of 12.3 excludes two of the 
crisis years but includes the P/E for 1991. Obviously, we cannot include the negative 
P/E for 1992 because that would incorrectly drag the average down, and it seems also 
a bit too much to include the absurd P/E for 1990. We have therefore replaced the 
two extreme observations with the more meaningful P/E for 1991. By following that 
procedure we arrive at a mean P/E that equals 13.5.  
Table 3: P/E mean, minimum and maximum1)
1969-2003 1969-1981 1982-2003
Mean 13,45 7,22 17,14
Mean (without 90 & 92) 12,26 7,22 15,53
Minimum 4,43 4,43 5,47
Maximum 33,19 11,17 33,19
1) Adjustments have been made for own shares but only for those companies who do 
not have option programs.
 
Figure 1 shows that the P/E is hovering around a fairly constant level until the late 
1970s. In 1980, the P/E reaches a 35-year low at 4.4, cf. below. The P/E is then 
drifting upwards until it peaks in the early 1990s. Following the crisis in the early 
1990s, valuations decline to more reasonable levels. From the mid 1990s, the P/E 
shows solid gains until the multiple peaks in 2001. The sharp decline that begins in 
2002 reverses essentially the gains in the P/E in the late 1990s. The Danish market is 
therefore at the end of 2003 traded at a P/E multiple close to the historic average. 
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Having said that it should also be noted that the mean P/E has drifted up, that is, the 
market has since the mid 1980s been traded at an earnings multiple that is about twice 
the level in the 1970s, see also Table 3. The upward drift in the P/E is likely to reflect 
– among other things – the fall in interest rates; we return to this at the end of this 
section when we discuss the development of the earnings yield.15  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Danish Price Earnings Index
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3.2 From Bust to Boom in the beginning of the 1980s 
 
As noted, the Danish P/E reaches its 35-year low in 1980. In that year the market is 
traded at a P/E equal to 4.4. A hike in the oil price (the second OPEC shock), 
persistent high wage growth, rising nominal interest rates to near 20 percent and a 
weak overall performance of the economy are likely to be key explanations of the 
historic low P/E multiple. The dismal performance of the economy prompted a policy 
regime shift in 1982, which paved the way for the outstanding bullish 1983. 
 
In 1983, the total share price index increased by 114 percent, which is the biggest 
price increase recorded in the 20th century in Denmark. It is common to attribute the 
soaring stock prices to three factors: First, there is a shift in economic policy towards 
a non-accommodation strategy in late 1982; key elements included a considerable 
tightening of the fiscal stance and a replacement of a soft peg with a firm 
commitment to a fixed exchange rate policy, see OECD (1986) and Dornbusch 
(1989). These policy changes resulted in a drop in long interest rates by around 7 
percentage points and in a more optimistic outlook, see Andersen and Risager (1988). 
The sharp drop in interest rates, the improved outlook for the economy and the higher 
risk appetite are likely to have spurred the market. Second, a new tax on institutional 
 12
                                          
15 There are several other factors that could have played a role; future work should look more into this issue. 
investors’ real bond yields (passed by the Parliament in 1983 to become effective in 
1984) made stocks more attractive to institutional investors given that stocks were 
exempt from this tax. Third, the rise in world stock markets in 1983 may also have 
had spill over effects even though capital market integration was not as deep as it is 
today. That said, it should also be noted that the international upturn was moderate 
relative to the Danish bull market; the S&P 500 for example went up by 17.9 percent 
in 2003.  
 
So far there has not been an attempt to link the soaring share prices to earnings. An 
important insight that follows immediately from the P/E index is that the bullish stock 
market had support in an even faster increase in profits; that explains why the 
aggregate P/E declines from 8.0 in 1982 to 5.5 in 1983. Figure 2 shows that the 
strong turn a round in profits is particular obvious in the banking sector. However, 
other branches also experience a considerable increase in profits. Taken together, 
profits in industry, service, trade and shipping are up by 82.9 percent. In industry 
alone, earnings are up by 22.6 percent.16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Earnings growth in 1983
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Company specific developments in share prices, earnings and price-earnings are 
given in Tables 4a and 4b. These tables show a diverse P/E development in the 
various firms and sectors. For all banks in the index, the price-earnings multiple 
declines in 1983 due to a sky rocketing earnings development. For all other 
companies (in industry, service, trade and shipping), the P/E goes up as the sharp 
increase in equity prices outweighs the earnings gains. It is therefore the outstanding 
earnings development in the banking sector that explains why the aggregate P/E fell 
in 1983 in spite of a (more than) doubling of share prices.   
 13
                                          
16 Note that the comparison is of course based on the same sample in the two years. 
The considerable improvement in 1983 of the leading companies’ profits and share 
prices indicates that the supply side could have played a larger role than what is 
normally considered to be the case in generating the strong employment and 
investment recovery following the macroeconomic regime change in 1982, see 
OECD (1986)17. The point is that firms base their investment and employment 
decisions on their own profitability estimates and not on economy wide profits and 
wage data, which (of course) show much less movement to justify the unusual strong 
expansion of the economy (under conventional labor demand elasticities etc.). Barry 
(1999) also hints at the possibility that the supply side may have been under-
estimated; future work should try to assess this hypothesis using firm specific 
earnings, employment and investment data.   
Price
Earnings 1) 
(mio. DKK) Shares EPS P/E Market value (DKK)
Banking
Andelsbanken 164,75 144,04 3.000.000 48,01 3,43 494.250.000                   
Danske Bank 187 517,16 9.500.000 54,44 3,44 1.776.500.000                
Handelsbanken 187 477,43 9.350.000 51,06 3,66 1.748.450.000                
Jyske Bank 275 117,90 2.260.000 52,17 5,27 621.500.000                   
Privatbanken 180 284,85 5.736.710 49,65 3,63 1.032.607.800                
Provinsbanken 160 74,47 3.200.000 23,27 6,87 512.000.000                   
Insurance
Codan Forsikring 331 181,30 1.253.688 144,61 2,29 414.970.563                   
Industry
Carlsberg B 642 87,94 1.496.250 58,77 10,92 960.592.500                   
Danisco 561 57,64 767.058 75,14 7,47 430.319.538                   
De Danske Spritfabrikker 517 50,00 650.000 76,92 6,72 336.050.000                   
De Danske Sukkerfabrikker 402 269,81 4.352.834 61,98 6,49 1.749.839.268                
FLS Industries B 176 191,00 5.444.085 35,08 5,02 958.158.960                   
GN Store Nord 179,75 65,00 2.013.064 32,29 5,57 361.848.290                   
NKT 169,5 30,99 2.554.340 12,13 13,97 432.960.630                   
Novo Nordisk 1.860 425,14 3.807.253 111,67 16,66 7.081.490.580                
Superfos B 97,5 -106,89 3.697.972 -28,90 -3,37 360.552.270                   
Service and Trade
KFK 300 76,50 1.300.000 58,84 5,10 390.000.000                   
Sophus Berendsen B 590 57,44 1.090.790 52,66 11,20 643.566.100                   
ØK 92,25 -349,19 7.650.000 -45,65 -2,02 705.712.500                   
Shipping
J.Lauritzen 1.525 46,96 396.000 118,58 12,86 603.900.000                   
Total 2699,47 8,012) 21.615.268.998      
1) Earnings represent earnings for the shares in our universe. In case the company has several share classes this is not
total company earnings.
2) Weighted average P/E
Table 4a: Share prices, earnings and P/E's in 1982
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17 The Danish economy experienced the strongest increase in employment (in the private sector) among the OECD 
countries in these years, see OECD (1986). 
Price
Earnings 1) 
(mio. DKK) Shares EPS P/E Market value (DKK)
Banking
Andelsbanken 352 518,31 4.100.000 126,42 2,78 1.443.200.000                
Danske Bank 371 1677,09 9.500.000 176,54 2,10 3.524.500.000                
Handelsbanken 338 1390,20 10.400.000 133,67 2,53 3.515.200.000                
Jyske Bank 690 912,55 2.300.000 396,76 1,74 1.587.000.000                
Privatbanken 359 1312,00 6.453.800 203,29 1,77 2.316.914.200                
Provinsbanken 352 472,44 4.000.000 118,11 2,98 1.408.000.000                
Insurance
Codan Forsikring 885 219,60 1.257.028 174,70 5,07 1.112.469.338                
Industry
Carlsberg B 1.230 97,66 1.496.250 65,27 18,85 1.840.387.500                
Danisco 1.050 76,42 1.086.500 70,34 14,93 1.140.825.000                
De Danske Spritfabrikker 995 76,20 710.000 107,32 9,27 706.450.000                   
De Danske Sukkerfabrikker 731 310,55 5.223.400 59,45 12,30 3.818.305.400                
FLS Industries B 300 -161,51 5.444.085 -29,67 -10,11 1.633.225.500                
GN Store Nord 659,00 95,00 2.013.064 47,19 13,96 1.326.609.308                
NKT 407,0 47,51 2.554.340 18,60 21,88 1.039.616.380                
Novo Nordisk 2.770 599,49 4.270.654 140,38 19,73 11.829.711.580              
Superfos B 518,0 171,50 3.971.096 43,19 11,99 2.057.027.728                
Service and Trade
KFK 772 132,04 1.300.000 101,57 7,60 1.003.600.000                
Sophus Berendsen B 1.145 77,98 1.094.550 71,25 16,07 1.253.259.750                
ØK 183,00 96,63 7.650.000 12,63 14,49 1.399.950.000                
Shipping
J.Lauritzen 1.600 36,09 396.000 91,13 17,56 633.600.000                   
Total 8157,76 5,472) 44.589.851.683      
1) Earnings represent earnings for the shares in our universe. In case the company has several share classes this is not
total company earnings.
2) Weighted average P/E.
Table 4b: Share prices, earnings and P/E's in 1983
 
 
3.3 Plummeting Earnings and P/E multiples in the Banking Sector in the early 
1990s and the Problems with ignoring Negative Earnings 
 
Following a number of profitable years for the banking sector after the successful 
stabilization of the economy, the profitability deteriorates in 1986 and in particular in 
the beginning of the 1990s. For those years it is crucial whether the P/E index 
includes all earnings or only positive earnings.18 
 
The unsatisfactory earnings performance in the beginning of the 1990s reflects in 
particular a dismal growth performance of the macro economy due to a tight domestic 
policy stance following the adoption of an austerity package (labeled the potato diet) 
in 1987. The considerable tightening of the policy stance came in response to signs of 
an overheating of the economy that led to excessive wage growth and a record high 
current account deficit in 1986. Thus, while almost all other OECD countries were 
 15
                                          
18 That is also the case in a number of other years notably 1986. The development in 1986 is outlined in Annex 3 to save 
space. 
growing fast in the late 1980s and in the beginning of the 1990s, the Danish economy 
went through a period with low growth and sharply increasing after tax interest rates 
following the adoption of the Potato Diet and the cut in the tax deductibility of 
interest payments. This led to falling real estate prices, business failures in the 
construction and real estate sector in particular and therefore to a sharp increase in the 
banking sector’s bad loan provisions. Moreover, as the banking sector also 
experienced portfolio losses and a slowdown in lending growth the scene was set for 
red numbers, which in 1992 outweighed the small albeit positive earnings reported by 
the other companies in the index, see Annex 3 for details.19 The sharp increase in the 
banking sectors’ losses shows how stressful a time it was for this sector; all the major 
banks managed, however, to muddle through without a rescue operation in the form 
of an injection of Government capital.20 
 
As noted earlier, the P/E skyrocketed in the early 1990s due to the depressed 
earnings. Had we not included the negative earnings we would have conveyed a 
completely different picture. Thus, by applying the Datastream method, the P/E in the 
three years from 1990 to 1992 stands at 20.7, 19.8 and 22.2.21 These ratios signal high 
valuations but they do not signal that the economy is in a crisis that could have led to 
a meltdown of some of the banks like in the other Nordic countries. The special filter 
that Datastream applies on the bad years has therefore the role of downplaying crisis 
situations.    
 
Table 5 states the results over the different sub periods when one applies the 
Datastream approach. For the first period 1969 to 1981, the mean P/E equals 7.04 and 
is only slightly below the 7.22 reported earlier in Table 3. In the period 1982 to 2003, 
the method that sets negative earnings to zero produces a P/E that equals 14.3, 
whereas the P/E in Table 3 equals 17.1. Thus, over the last 20 years the bias in the 
P/E estimation equals 2.8.  
 
 
                                          
19 Baltica, Danske Bank, Top Danmark, Unibank and ØK reported negative earnings in 1992 that outweigh the 
relatively small profits of the other KFX companies, see Annex 3. Besides suffering from a tight domestic policy stance, 
the economy is in 1992 also adversely affected by the widespread turmoil in the international financial markets 
including a number of currency crises in Europe. 
 
20 This was not the case in the other Nordic countries, see Englund (1999), Steigum (1992) and Vihriala (1997) who 
contain insightful accounts of the Swedish, Finnish and the Norwegian banking crises. 
  
21 Companies with negative earnings enter the numerator in equation (2) with their market cap but their earnings are 
arbitrarily set to zero in the denominator. If one wanted to calculate a kind of “permanent P/E” one could work with a 
moving average of past earnings. 
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Table 5: P/E mean, minimum and maximum1)
1969-2003 1969-1981 1982-2003
Mean 11,62 7,04 14,33
Minimum 4,43 4,43 5,36
Maximum 22,37 11,17 22,37
1) Using Datastreams method (negative earnings are set to zero).
 
 
3.4 Lagged Share Price Correction following the Bursting of the Bubble 
 
The strong co movement of equity markets and the trend setting role of US markets 
are stylized facts and also evident from Figure 3 that plots the P/E on the S&P 500 
and the KFX. Like the S&P 500, the Danish P/E is also following an increasing trend 
from the mid 1990s. That said, it is perhaps more interesting to comment on the large 
differences between the two markets: An obvious yet important difference is that 
Danish valuations never reached the levels in the US. In addition, the Danish P/E 
continued to go up following the bursting of the IT bubble in March 2000. Thus, the 
market peaks in 2001 at a P/E equal to 31.9, which is much later than the S&P 500. 
The more moderate upturn and the lagged correction are likely to reflect among other 
things that IT stocks only play a minor role in the Danish market.  
 
The correction of the Danish market essentially reverses the gains in the P/E in the 
1990s. The Danish market is therefore at the end of 2003 traded close to its historic 
mean. This is yet another difference to the S&P 500, which was traded significantly 
above its historic mean, see Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: P/E on the S&P 500 and the KFX
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Source for S&P 500: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/faculty/shiller.htm
Mean S&P 500
Mean KFX
Period 1969-2003 1969-1994 1995-2003
S&P 5001) 18,24 13,54 31,81
Danish P/E 13,45 11,68 18,57
1) Source for S&P 500: Shiller
Table 6: Comparative Statistics: Mean P/E on the S&P 500 and the KFX
 
According to the most basic equity valuation model, the current market value equals 
next year’s expected earnings capitalized by the required rate of return. Another way 
to put this is to say that the expected earnings yield (expected E relative to current P) 
should equal the required return.22 Because the latter equals the yield on a risk free 
bond plus a risk premium, the expected earnings yield should in the absence of large 
swings in the premium vary in line with the yield on a Government bond. This is also 
sometimes labelled the Fed Method because the US Federal Reserve uses this method 
in assessing the valuation of stocks relative to bond yields. The Fed’s and the 
Markets’ use of this model does of course reflect its simplicity; nobody claims that 
this approach gives the complete picture. Moreover, in the absence of expected 
(forward) earnings yields over long historic periods it is common to plot the actual 
earnings yield (earnings relative to equity prices last year) and the yield on a 
Government bond in order to get a first impression of the relation, see Figure 4. 
By inspecting Figure 4 it is obvious that the earnings yield is more volatile than the 
bond yield. The volatility of the earnings yield seems, however, to have declined in 
recent years. That said, it is also clear that high (low) interest rates tend to go hand in 
hand with high (low) earnings yields as expected from the theory. Indeed, had we 
drawn the moving average of the series that tendency would stand out very clearly.  
 
The interest rate hike that most economists are expecting at this juncture should 
therefore lead to rising earnings yields, which could lead to declining share prices, 
assuming that the risk premium does not decline or that earnings growth does not 
accelerate.23 Finally, it is also interesting to note that during the last years of the 
bubble period, the government bond yield exceeded the earnings yield. The risk 
premium had therefore turned negative, which is another indicator of highly 
optimistic equity pricing. In 2003, the earnings yield did, however, again exceed the 
government bond yield. 
    
                                          
22 This assumes that investors are concerned about earnings growth only in the short term, that is, over the next year. 
Short sighted (myopic) investors is a theme that is often emphasized by the Behavioral Finance School, see Barberis 
and Thaler (2003) and by Keynes (1936) and earlier authors. Another approach is to assume that investors have infinite 
horizons like in the Gordon model. Under the assumption of constant earnings growth, the expected earnings yield is 
then given as (Expected E)//Current P) = (R-g)/k where k is the payout ratio, R is the required nominal return and g is 
expected nominal earnings growth. If g and k are constant, the expected earnings yield should be closely correlated with 
the required return R and therefore with the bond yield. 
23 It goes beyond the purpose of this paper to discuss the likely adjustment of equity prices to the future rate hikes. 
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Figure 4: The earnings-price ratio and the 10-year 
government bond yield1)
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1) Earnings over the year relative to ex-ante prices. The bond yield is the yield recorded at the beginning of the year.
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4. Conclusions 
 
The main purpose of this paper has been to present price-earnings series for the last 
35 years for Danish stock market and to make these data available for researchers and 
analysts. To this end we have collected price, earnings and share data information, 
including information on share buy-backs and option programs, for the 20 largest and 
most liquid shares. These shares constitute by and large the Copenhagen Stock 
Exchange’s KFX price index, which has existed since 1989.  
 
The construction of the P/E index is based on the principles of liquidity and historic 
consistency. The index therefore includes the liquid B shares but not the A shares 
since large trades in A shares are generally not feasible. As regards earnings 
consistency, we used The Result for the Year since this is the only earnings measure 
that has been reported throughout the sample period. Moreover, we systematically 
screened firms’ income statements in order to detect abrupt accounting changes, 
which we did on a few occasions. In these cases we only included the most recent 
data for the particular share.  
 
The results show that over the 35 years from 1969 to 2003 the average P/E equals 
13.5. The P/E reaches a 35-year low in 1980 at 4.4. A hike in the oil price, persistent 
high wage cost increases and annual interest rates approaching 20 percent are likely 
to be key factors in explaining the depressed valuation ratio. The market peaks in the 
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early 1990s (due to depressed earnings in the financial sector in particular) and in 
2001 (due to optimistic equity pricing). The high P/E in the late 1990s and in the 
beginning of the 21st century are of course intimately related to the developments in 
US markets, but there are also important differences across markets. Notwithstanding 
optimistic equity pricing also in Denmark, valuations did never reach the levels in the 
US. In addition, Danish P/E multiples continued to go up following the bursting of 
the IT bubble on Nasdaq in March 2000 unlike the S&P 500 that started to dive 
already in 2000. The more moderate upturn and the lagged correction of the Danish 
market are likely to reflect the minor role of IT and growth stocks in the Danish 
market. The correction that sets in subsequently reverses essentially the gains in the 
Danish P/E in the 1990s. The Danish market is therefore at the end of 2003 traded at 
a P/E close to the historic average unlike the S&P, which was traded significantly 
above the historic average. 
 
In constructing the P/E series the paper took account of share buy-backs, which is a 
phenomenon that has become increasingly important. The paper also discussed the 
likely effects of employee option programs. Finally, the paper estimated the 
consequence of setting negative company earnings to zero as is done by Datastream. 
The results show that this introduces a negative bias in the mean P/E over the last 20 
years of almost three points. Moreover, the special filter is also dampening the effect 
of the financial sector crisis in the early 1990s. Thus, the filtered P/E does not signal 
“crisis” even though some of the large players in the financial sector were not far 
from collapsing like several large financial institutions did in the other Nordic 
countries, see Englund (1999), Steigum (1992) and Vihriala (1997). 
   
The price-earnings data allow us to analyze important historic events like the record 
share price increase in 1983, which so far has not been related to firms’ earnings 
development. The evidence shows that the soaring equity prices had support in an 
impressive earnings development in particular in the banking sector but also in 
industry and services. The strong improvement in the leading companies’ profitability 
indicates that the supply side could have played a larger role than what is normally 
considered to be the case in generating the strong recovery following the 
macroeconomic regime shift in 1982. Barry (1999) is hinting at this possibility, 
which deserves to be thoroughly examined in future work.  
 
The period we have looked at has vigorous upturns but also sharp declines in 
earnings as witnessed by the banking sector crisis in the beginning of the 1990s. We 
suspect that high earnings volatility is one factor that will help to explain the low 
Danish P/E relative to the S&P besides differences in sector composition. The data 
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that we have presented in this paper can help us obtaining some insight into this and a 
number of other earnings related issues.24  
 
 
 
References 
 
Andersen T.M. and O. Risager, 1988, Stabilization policies, credibility, and interest 
rate determination in a small open economy, European Economic Review, 32, 669-
679. 
 
A.P. Møller, 2002, Aktieselskabet Dampskibsselskabet Svendborg 2002 (Annual 
Report). 
 
Barberis N. and R. Thaler, 2003, A Survey of Behavioral Finance, in Handbook of 
Economics and Finance, North Holland. 
 
Barry F., 1999, Comment, in T.M. Andersen, S.E.H. Jensen and O. Risager, 
Macroeconomic Perspectives on the Danish Economy, MacMillan, 257-260.  
 
Beckman, K. and P. Løchte Jørgensen, 2004, The Value and Incentives of Option-
Based Compensation in Danish Listed Companies, Journal of Derivatives 
Accounting, 1, 91-109. 
 
U.M. Bergman and M.M. Hutchison, 1999, Economic Expansions and Fiscal 
Contractions: International Evidence and the 1982 Danish Stabilization, in T.M. 
Andersen, S.E.H. Jensen and O. Risager, Macroeconomic Perspectives on the Danish 
Economy, MacMillan, 225-256 
 
Cortes F., M. Lyon and I. W. Marsh, 2002, Is there still magic in corporate earnings?, 
Financial Stability Review, 2002, 142-152. 
 
Dornbusch, R., 1989, Ireland’s disinflation, Economic Policy, 8, 173-210.  
 
Englund, P., 1990, Financial Deregulation in Sweden, European Economic Review, 
34, 385-93. 
 
                                          
24 To this end it would be attractive to have quarterly data but that is unfortunately only possible for the last five to eight 
years simply because firms previously did not report quarterly earnings (and there is still one KFX company that reports 
only twice a year). 
 21
Englund, P., 1999, The Swedish Banking Crisis: Roots and Consequences, Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy, 15, 80-97. 
 
Fama E. and K. French, 1998, Value versus Growth: The International Evidence, 
Journal of Finance, 53, 1975-99.  
 
Frennberg, P. and B. Hansson, 1992, Computation of a Monthly Index for Swedish 
Stock Returns 1919-1989, Scandinavian Economic History Review, 40, 3-27. 
 
Giavazzi, F. and Pagano (1990), Can severe fiscal contractions be expansionary? 
Tales of two small European Countries, in O.J. Blanchard and S. Fischer (eds), NBER 
Macroeconomics Annual, 75-123. 
 
Keynes, J. M., 1936, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, 
MacMillan. 
 
Lakonishok, J., A. Shleifer and R. Vishny, 1994, Contrarian investment, 
extrapolation, and risk, Journal of Finance, 49, 1541-78. 
 
Nielsen S. and O. Risager, 2001, Stock Returns and Bond Yields in Denmark, 1922-
1999, Scandinavian Economic History Review, 49, 63-82. 
 
OECD, 1986, Country Study: Denmark (Paris: OECD). 
 
Risager O., 2003, The A.P. Møller Shares, the U.S. Dollar and the Price of Oil, 
Working Paper, Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School. 
 
Shiller R., 2000, Irrational Exuberance (Princeton University Press, New Jersey). 
 
Steigum, E. , 1992, Financial Deregulation, Credit Boom and Banking Crisis: The 
Case of Norway, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, 
Discussion Paper 15/92. 
 
Vihriala, V., 1997, Banks and the Finnish Credit Cycle 1986-95, Bank of Finland 
Economic Studies E:7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 22
Company 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Banking
Andelsbanken 3,2
BG Bank 8,1
Bikuben 3,7 4,4
Den Danske Bank 9,7 15,7 16,8 12,6 20,3 17,6 20,3 25,0
Handelsbanken 6,0
Jyske Bank 2,6 2,8 2,6 2,7 3,4 4,0
Nordic Baltic Holding/Nordea
Privatbanken 4,7
Provinsbanken 4,1
Unidanmark 11,4 9,2 4,7 8,7 10,9 12,9 14,3
Insurance
Baltica 9,7
Baltica Holding 6,9 13,3 10,1 2,3
Codan forsikring 5,2 6,6
Hafnia Holding A 2,3 3,1 2,3
Hafnia Holding B 3,1 3,6 2,8
Kapital Holding (RealDanmark)
Topdanmark 2,8 3,4 2,5 1,8 2,9 2,6
Industry
Bang & Olufsen
Carlsberg A 3,5 3,9 13,3 9,0 10,3 9,3
Carlsberg B 6,4 7,2 8,5 7,4 8,9 11,2
Chr. Hansen 2,8 2,2 3,7
Coloplast 3,6 4,9
Danisco 8,7 9,2 11,0 6,8 10,8 11,9 14,8 19,9
FLS B 5,6 4,7 3,3 3,0 3,8 3,3 5,8
GN Store Nord 1,5 3,3 2,9 2,7 3,4
H. Lundbeck
i-data international
Navision Damgaard (Navision)
Navision Software
NEG Micon
NKT 2,8 3,1 2,8 2,5
Novo Nordisk B 8,2 8,6 15,4 17,6 21,4 18,6 24,4 35,0
Novozymes B
Radiometer B 2,0 1,9 4,0 2,5 3,5 3,1
Superfos 2,2 2,1 2,2 2,0 2,5 3,0 4,6
Vestas Wind Systems
William Demant
Service & Trade
Danske Luftfartselskaber 2,5 3,9
DSV B
Group 4 Falck
ISS B 1,9 2,1 2,9 3,4 5,0 4,3 3,3 4,0
KBH Lufthavne 2,9 3,8 5,5
Luftfart A 3,1 1,7
Ratin
SAS Danmark 3,4
S. Berendsen A 3,2
S. Berendsen B 3,0 3,9 6,1 6,9 9,7 8,8 11,2 15,1
Teledanmark B/TDC 19,5 19,2 20,4
ØK 5,8 4,7 4,0 1,8 3,8 3,0 2,4
Shipping
DFDS 1,3
D/S 1912 A 9,6 8,8 11,3 8,5
D/S 1912 B 9,6 8,8 11,3 8,3 13,9 12,6 11,4 16,4
J. Lauritzen Holding 3,6 3,2 4,3 3,2
Svendborg B 9,7 8,7 11,2 8,2 13,9 12,4 11,4 16,3
Svendborg A 9,7
A.P. Møller - Mærsk A+B
Investment
FIH B 2,2
Potagua B 3,0 2,5
Number of shares in KFX 25 24 25 19 20 20 20 20
Source: Copenhagen Stock Exchange
Annex 1: Companies in the KFX portfolio; market capitalization in billions of DKK, 1989-2003
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Company 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Banking
Andelsbanken
BG Bank 13,7
Bikuben
Den Danske Bank 48,4 44,3 42,9 67,2 98,9 86,0 98,8
Handelsbanken
Jyske Bank 7,7 4,6 6,1 6,3 6,4 7,2 11,2
Nordic Baltic Holding/Nordea 41,9 23,5 13,7 15,7
Privatbanken
Provinsbanken
Unidanmark 23,8 22,2 34,0
Insurance
Baltica
Baltica Holding
Codan forsikring
Hafnia Holding A
Hafnia Holding B
Kapital Holding (RealDanmark) 10,7 20,9 30,8
Topdanmark 4,4 5,5 7,9
Industry
Bang & Olufsen 5,0 4,6
Carlsberg A
Carlsberg B 10,6 11,4 8,0 10,5 10,0 8,9 7,8
Chr. Hansen
Coloplast 5,9 7,0 7,8 8,7 12,2 11,4 11,2
Danisco 23,4 21,9 16,8 20,2 17,3 12,8 13,9
FLS B 6,3 5,6 7,3
GN Store Nord 4,3 7,7 14,3 34,9 10,9 4,5 8,4
H. Lundbeck 17,2 35,1 49,1 43,5 23,1
i-data international 6,6
Navision Damgaard (Navision) 8,1
Navision Software 6,2
NEG Micon 10,4 5,5 3,2 2,6
NKT 11,2
Novo Nordisk B 63,3 47,6 63,4 120,3 102,0 63,0 72,4
Novozymes B 10,9 9,6 14,0
Radiometer B
Superfos 5,4
Vestas Wind Systems 13,7 49,7 24,0 7,4 10,2
William Demant 10,4 31,2 16,1 11,4 14,1
Service & Trade
Danske Luftfartselskaber
DSV B 3,6 5,5
Group 4 Falck 3,8 5,8 10,0 22,1 19,3 13,2 10,8
ISS B 6,5 10,8 16,9 21,7 17,2 11,3 13,0
KBH Lufthavne 7,5 6,5
Luftfart A
Ratin 21,4 16,5
SAS Danmark 4,8
S. Berendsen A
S. Berendsen B 22,5 5,1 3,4
Teledanmark B/TDC 27,0 74,2 118,8 89,8 63,8 37,8 46,3
ØK
Shipping
DFDS
D/S 1912 A
D/S 1912 B 34,2 25,6 47,0 45,4 30,4 26,8
J. Lauritzen Holding
Svendborg B 33,7 25,3 45,8 43,2 28,0 26,6
Svendborg A
A.P. Møller - Mærsk A+B 186,4
Investment
FIH B
Potagua B
Number of shares in KFX 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Source: Copenhagen Stock Exchange
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Annex 2. Shrinking profits in the Banking sector in 1986 
 
In 1986 earnings drop due to a lacklustre performance of the Banking sector in 
particular. The fall in earnings sends the P/E index up given that share prices did not 
fall as much as earnings. The P/E multiple increases to 22.5 in 1986. Had we set the 
negative earnings to zero (like Datastream), the P/E would have been equal to 15.5. 
Again, this filter is downplaying the role of unusual bad performance.   
 
 
Price Earnings Shares EPS P/E Market value
Banking
Andelsbanken 415 662,198 5.227.500 126,675849 3,276078 2.169.412.500         
Danske Bank 400 1852,2806 14.175.000 130,672350 3,061091 5.670.000.000         
Handelsbanken 349 1433,2151 14.465.000 99,081584 3,522350 5.048.285.000         
Jyske Bank 850 909,9239 2.749.000 331,001772 2,567962 2.336.650.000         
Privatbanken 339 509,6030 10.526.010 48,413691 7,002151 3.568.317.390         
Price Earnings Shares EPS P/E Market value
Banking
Andelsbanken 343 19,307 6.628.590 2,912686 117,760728 2.273.606.370         
Danske Bank 314 31,7711 16.200.000 1,961181 160,107620 5.086.800.000         
Handelsbanken 260 -821,2250 14.465.000 -56,773246 -4,579622 3.760.900.000         
Jyske Bank 470 -51,2545 3.850.000 -13,312861 -35,304207 1.809.500.000         
Privatbanken 254 60,9080 11.379.800 5,352291 47,456314 2.890.469.200         
Provinsbanken 324 70,0738 9.200.000 7,616715 42,538025 2.980.800.000         
The Banking sector in 1985
The Banking sector in 1986
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Annex 3: Total earnings in millions of DKK 1990-19921)
 
Company 1990 1991 1992
Banking
Bikuben 166 -20
Den Danske Bank 1.318 -1.583
Jyske Bank -204 44
Unidanmark -945 -1.427 -4.006
Insurance
Baltica Holding -1.791 128 -4.434
Codan forsikring -28 275
Hafnia Holding B -878 -772
Topdanmark 8 -273 -53
Industry
Bang & Olufsen -68 -28
Carlsberg B 212 221 383
Chr. Hansen 49 63 91
Coloplast 68 79
CW Obel 58 172 87
Danisco 995 988 809
FLS B 482 524 232
GN Store Nord 185 93 33
NKT 121 110 43
Novo Nordisk B 665 795 1.093
Novozymes B
Radiometer B 103 97 149
Superfos 174 124
Service & Trade
ISS B 154 201 219
KFK 200 165 169
Luftfart -228
S. Berendsen B 297 290 332
ØK 321 245 -1.184
Shipping
J. Lauritzen Holding 230 320 74
Total earnings 280 3.721 -7.468
Number of shares in the index 24 25 19
1) The shares in the index follows the KFX which included 24, 25 and 19 shares in the three years.
Because we excluded the A shares some of the above shares are substitutes for those that were taken 
out.
 
 
